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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
While Justice Black's opinion indicates that courts-martial of
civilian dependents for all crimes is unconstitutional, 19 Justice Frank-
furter strictly limits himself to the facts of the case. He did state,
though, that "the taking of life is irrevocable" 20 and that:
It is in capital cases especially that the balance of conflicting interests must
be weighted most heavily in favor of the procedural safeguards of the Bill
of Rights.21
Justice Harlan specifically concurs "... on the narrow ground that
where the offense is capital, Article 2(11) cannot constitutionally be
applied to the trial of civilian dependents." 22 He argues:
In such cases the law is especially sensitive to demands for that procedural
fairness which inheres in a civilian trial where the judge and trier of fact are
not responsive to the command of the convening authority.23
The instant case poses a difficult question: how to try military-
connected civilians accused of crimes in foreign lands. To suspend
completely the practice of allowing dependents to accompany military
forces abroad would undoubtedly be bad for military morale. Yet
it is imperative that a solution be found to the problem raised by
the Court's decision in order that there will be no "crime without
punishment." Among the possible solutions are: constitutional
amendment; trial of such civilians by the foreign jurisdiction, as is
the case with American tourists; trial of such civilians in the United
States; or the establishment of civilian courts overseas.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY - FAILURE TO
ANSwER JURYMEN'S QUESTION HELD NOT NECESSARILY REVERSIBLE
ERRoR.-Defendant was convicted on counts of kidnapping and felony
murder. Although his sole defense was insanity, the trial judge
failed to answer the jury's question as to whether they must find for
defendant if they believed him to have been insane part of the time
during the commission of the crime. Section 427 of the New York
Code of Criminal Procedure provides that information on a point of
law desired by the jury must be given in open court.1 The Court
29 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 7 (1957).
2o Id. at 45 (concurring opinion).
21 Id. at 45-46 (concurring opinion).
2 2 Id. at 65 (concurring opinion).
2 3 Id. at 77 (concurring opinion).
1 "After the jury have retired for deliberation, if there be a disagreement
between them as to any part of the testimony, or if they desire to be informed
of a point of law arising in the cause, they must require the officer to conduct
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of Appeals, in affirming the conviction, held that failure to answer the
question posed was, if anything, beneficial to the defendant and there-
fore did not constitute reversible error. People v. La Marca, 3 N.Y.2d
452, 144 N.E.2d 420 (1957).
At common law, the giving of additional instructions to the jury,
after it has retired and begun deliberations, is usually in the discre-
tion of the trial judge.2  Generally, pertinent requests from the jury
will be answered if within the scope of the jury's function.3 How-
ever, trial judges have declined to help recall testimony 4 or to answer
questions because they were irrelevant or immaterial,5 although it has
been held that jurors should receive a positive instruction to put an
irrelevant question out of their minds. 6 The Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure do not specifically cover this problem.7 However,
federal cases have held that, while additional instructions are in the
court's discretion,8 a trial judge should clear away jury difficulties
"with concrete accuracy." 9
A few states have statutes similar to New York's Section 427.10
These statutes are largely concerned with the presence of the defend-
ant or his counsel or both during additional instructions. They have
not been construed to give an absolute mandate to the trial judge to
answer questions."
them into court. Upon their being brought into court, the information re-
quired nust be given after notice to the district attorney and to the counsel
for the defendant, and in cases of felony, in the presence of the defendant."
N.Y. CoDD Casm. Poc. § 427 (emphasis added).
2See Allis v. United States, 155 U.S. 117 (1894); White v. Calder,
35 N.Y. 183 (1866). See also BowERs, THE JumicAL Disc rox or TrxAL
CouaRs §346 (1931).
~
3 See United States v. Oppenhein, 228 Fed. 220 (N.D.N.Y. 1915), rev'd
on other grounds, 241 Fed. 625 (2d Cir. 1917) ; Burrows v. Unwin, 3 Car. & P.
310, 172 Eng. Rep. 434 (K.B. 1828).
4 Commonwealth v. Westwood, 324 Pa. 289, 188 AUt. 304 (1936).
5 People v. Carnal, 1 Park. Cr. 256 (N.Y. 1851); Stratton v. Common-
wealth, 263 S.W.2d 99 (Ky. 1953). A typical situation would be a request
for information on punishment or the possibility of future pardon or parole.
See Gibson v. State, 223 S.W2d 625 (Te. 1949).8 State v. Conner, 241 N.C. 468, 85 S.E2d 584 (1955).
7 See FED. R. CRim. P. 30.
8 Tyrell v. United States, 200 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 910 (1953); Mendelson v. United States, 58 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
9 Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 613 (1946).
2 oSee CAL. Pax. CoDE ANN. § 1138 (West 1956) ; OHio Ray. CODE § 2315.06
(1953); ORE. Ray. STAT. § 17.325 (1953); Tax. CODE Clm. PRoc. art. 677
(1925).11 An Oregon court has declared: "It is to be noted that the mandatory
obligation of the statute is that if any information as to the law is given by
the trial court it shall be given in the presence of the attorneys or after due
notice has been given to the parties or their attorneys. This statute does not
in itself require the court to reinstruct a jury. It is, of course, necessary
that the court state to the jury all matters of law which it thinks necessary
for their information in giving their verdict." State v. Vaughn, 265 P.2d 249,
250 (Ore. 1954). But see State v. Kennedy, 72 Ohio App. 462, 52 N.E.2d
873 (1943).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
In New York, application of Section 427 is similarly concerned
with the giving of instructions in open court.12 In recent years, how-
ever, Section 427 has been invoked as the statutory basis for an
obligation on the part of the judge to answer a query by the jury.13
In People v. Cooke,14 the trial judge declined to answer the question
whether a premeditated act to cause serious injury furnished intent
to kill and instead re-read part of his original charge on intent. The
conviction was affirmed on the ground that there had been no sub-
stantial prejudice to defendant's rights. In his dissent, Chief Tudge
Lehman asserted that Section 427 "leaves to the trial court no dis-
cretion whether or not to give the information." 15
Subsequently, in People v. Gonzalez 1 and People v. Gezzo,17
first-degree murder convictions were reversed on grounds of substan-
tial error when the court did not answer jury questions. In the
Gonzalez case, the court expressed agreement with the Cooke dissent's
interpretation of the statute.18 The trial judge had failed to answer
questions -suggesting jury confusion as to whether possession of a
weapon indicated the requisite intent. Section 427 was held to re-
quire an answer from the bench to a "proper question" or to one on
"a vital point." 19 In the Gegzo case, which presented a similar set
of facts, the court qualified its language in the Gonzalez case by point-
ing out that ". . . of course, it is not the law that any failure by a
12 See, e.g., People v. Shapiro, 3 N.Y2d 203, 144 N.E.2d 12 (1957);
People v. Kennedy, 57 Hun 532, 11 N.Y. Supp. 244 (Sup. Ct. 1890). The
earliest cases considering § 427 referred to it as requiring notice to counsel of
intent to give additional instructions and did not suggest that there was also
imposed an obligation to answer. People v. Cassiano, 30 Hun 388, 1 N.Y.
Grim. 505 (Sup. Ct. 1883); Cornish v. Graff, 36 Hun 160 (Sup. Ct. 1885).
In the Cassiano case the trial judge in response to a jury question told thejurors, in the absence of counsel, that punishment for murder was not for
their consideration. In reversing, holding counsel's absence prejudicial, the
appellate court cited § 427 and noted that the furnishing of the information
was "within the discretionary power of the court even if it was not a legal
right." People v. Cassiano, supra at 390, 1 N.Y. Grim. at 507 (emphasis
added). While it is doubtful that information as to punishment may be given
to the jury, [see State v. Daley, 54 Ore. 514, 103 Pac. 502 (1909)], it is of
interest that, in citing § 427, the court in the Cassiano case asserted that
there was no legal right to have the question answered.
13 People v. Gezzo, 307 N.Y. 385, 121 N.E.2d 380 (1954); People v.
Gonzalez, 293 N.Y. 259, 56 N.E.2d 574 (1944) ; cf. People v. Flynn, 290 N.Y.
220, 48 N.E.2d 495 (1943). Although the court did not cite § 427, it was
noted 'in the Gonzalez case that the statute was considered in reaching the
decision. People v. Gonzalez, supra at 262, 56 N.E.2d at 576.
14 292 N.Y. 185, 54 N.E.2d 357 (1944).
'5 People v. Cooke, 292 N.Y. 185, 193, 54 N.E.2d 357, 361 (1944).
16 293 N.Y. 259, 56 N.E.2d 574 (1944).
17307 N.Y. 385, 121 N.E.2d 380 (1954).
I' "The Legislature of this State has in section 427 made positive and abso-
lute the requirement that 'the information required must be given.'" People v.
Gonzalez, 293 N.Y. 259, 263, 56 N.E.2d 574, 576 (1944).
19 Id. at 262-63, 56 N.E.2d at 576-77.
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court categorically to answer any question propounded by a jury
constitutes error." 20
In the La Marca case, the Court distinguished the Gonzalez and
Gezzo cases on their facts 21 and quoted from the Cooke majority
opinion.2 2 The psychiatrist for the defense had testified to the effect
that defendant did not know his act was wrong until the day follow-
ing its commission. Since, however, kidnapping is a continuing crime,
the jury could find that defendant had persisted in the act after realiz-
ing its wrongful nature and had therefore become criminally respon-
sible. The jury's question-"If one should belive [sic] that the
defendent [sic] was insane part of the time during the commission
of the crime must we find in favor of the defendent [sic]" 2 3-- could
only be answered in the negative. Thus, reasoned the Court, no
harmful inference could have been drawn by the jury: if a negative
answer were assumed, that would have been correct; if positive, that
would have incorrectly benefited the defendant. A clear rule thus
emerges, distinct from any consideration of Section 427; only an
implication arising from a judge's refusal to respond that is preju-
dicial to defendant's rights will require reversal.
The interpretation advanced by the dissent in the instant case
places the emphasis upon the clause in Section 427, ". . . information
required must be given . . ." 24 which it has taken out of context.
This approach might unduly burden trial judges when confronted
with irrelevancies from inexperienced jurors.
The Court has, in effect, applied the essence of Section 542 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure: "After hearing the appeal, the
court must give judgment, without regard to technical errors or de-
fects or to exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of
the parties." 25 The result of the La Marca decision is to leave re-
sponse to jury questions in the court's discretion.
X
FDERAL JURISDICTIoN-STocKHOLDER'S DERIVATIVE AcTIoN-
HELD ANTAGONISM EXISTS WHEN MANAGEMENT IS ALIGNED
20 People v. Gezzo, 307 N.Y. 385, 396, 121 N.E.2d 380, 385 (1954), para-
phrasing People v. Cooke, 292 N.Y. 185, 188, 54 N.E2d 357, 359 (1944).2 1 People v. La Marca, 3 N.Y2d 452, 462, 144 N.E.2d 420, 426 (1957).
22 Id. at 461, 144 N.E.2d at 425. The Cooke majority opinion was written by
judge Desmond, who dissented in the instant case quoting the Cooke dissent.
23 Ibid.
24 Id. at 466-67, 144 N.E.2d at 429.25 N.Y. CoDE CRIM. PRoc. § 542. The court tacitly avoided the caveat of the
Cooke dissent which said "no appellate court may disregard the error under sec-
tion 542 of the Code of Criminal Procedure." People v. Cooke, 292 N.Y. 185,
193, 54 N.E2d 357, 361 (1944).
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